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CALIFORNIA PUTATIVE SPOUSES: THE
INNOCENT, THE GUILTY, AND THE LAW
Helen Chang*
INTRODUCTION
The putative spouse doctrine permits the court to include an otherwise
void or voidable marriage under the protective umbrella of California's
community property system.' The doctrine derives its literal meaning from
the word "putative," which is defined as "reputed," "supposed," or
commonly esteemed ' 2 and applies to those "marriages" in which at least
one of the parties believes that they are legally married. The term is
applied to a matrimonial union which has been solemnized in due form and
celebrated in good faith by at least one of the parties but which by reason of
some legal infirmity is either void or voidable.4
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. My gratitude and respect to
brilliant colleagues and friends: Michael Zamperini, Janice Kosel, and Marc Greenberg for their
never-ending support. A special thank you to Roger Bernhardt whose inquiry regarding putative
spouses in California provided the inspiration for this article.
1. A putative marriage exists if at least one of the spouses believes s/he is legally married
but the marriage is void "because of some legal infirmity." Recknor v. Recknor, 187 Cal. Rptr.
887, 890-91 (Ct. App. 1982); Vargas v. Vargas, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 780 (Ct. App. 1974). For
example, Husband and Wife 1 are legally mramed and later believe they are legally divorced.
Husband then enters into a second "marriage" with Wife 2 but since the divorce from Wife I is
invalid, Husband cannot be legally married to Wife 2. Wife 1 is a legal spouse and Wife 2 is a
putative spouse. See Cal. Fain. Code § 2251 (West 2004) ("(a) If a determination is made that a
marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good
faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall: (1) Declare the party or parties to have the status
of a putative spouse. (2) If the division of property is in issue, divide ... that property acquired
during the union which would have been community property or quasi-community property if the
union had not been void or voidable. This property is known as "quasi-marital property"...
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1432 (10th ed. 2009).
3. Recknor, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
4. Krone v. Krone (In re Krone's Estate), 189 P.2d 741, 742 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
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California's putative spouse doctrine is not a pure one. Putative
spouses are included in the community property system by analogy only.
5
They are not considered legally married.6 By contrast, same sex married
couples are simply deemed legally married.7 Only certain benefits and
privileges of a legal marriage are available to putative spouses whereas all
of the benefits and privileges of a legal marriage flow to registered domestic
partners. 8 For some marital benefits, the spouse in a putative marriage must
qualify as a good faith putative spouse.9 Without such good faith, certain
benefits of a legal marriage are denied to the guilty putative spouse. 10 As to
the division of property upon annulment, putative spouses are treated the
same as married spouses resulting in an equal division of their property."
California courts traditionally applied the putative spouse doctrine if at
least one of the "spouses" had a good faith belief in the existence of a legal
marriage in the equal division of property upon annulment. 2 Even if one
spouse lacked good faith, the doctrine still applied if the other spouse held
such a belief.3 One California appellate court has recently questioned the
traditional interpretation of the putative spouse doctrine for property
division by limiting putative spouse status to the innocent spouse only. 14
California appellate courts are also split as to whether the putative spouse
doctrine can be applied to registered domestic couples.15
5. Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 33
(1985).
6. Id.
7. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by statute, CAL. CONST. art.
1, § 7.5 (2008), as recognized in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (U.S. 2013).
8. For example, putative spouses are not entitled to a family allowance during the probate
administration of the decedent spouse's estate. See Hafner v. Hafner, 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 691 (Ct.
App. 1986). And only good faith putative spouses have standing to bring a wrongful death claim
for the death of a spouse. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60(b) (West 2005) (defining "putative
spouse" to mean "the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to
have believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid.").
9. Only an innocent or good faith putative spouse may bring a wrongful death action for the
death of a spouse. See Ceja v. Rudolph and Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2013). Only an
innocent putative spouse may recover attorney's fees and costs in the annulment. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 2255 (West 2004).
10. See id
11. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 225 1(a)(2) (West 2004).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Tejeda v. Tejeda (In re Marriage of Tejeda), 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361, 367-68 (Ct. App.
2009) (holding that the guilt of one spouse does not preclude a finding of a putative marriage).
15. Compare Velez v. Smith, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 656-57 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the
putative spouse doctrine does not apply to registered domestic partners), with Ellis v. Arriaga (In
re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga), 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 406 (Ct. App. 2008)
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This Article traces the historical roots of the putative spouse doctrine,
its codification in California, its application in California, and recommends
that California adopt a pure putative spouse system and simply include
putative spouses as legal spouses for all purposes as it has done for
registered domestic partners. To allow some but not all of the incidents of
marriage to putative spouses is confusing, sometimes inequitable, and
contrary to the expectations of the innocent spouse. California has a history
of piecemeal legislation in family law without consideration of varying
consequences and without regard to the historical purpose and policy of the
rule.
16
The putative spouse doctrine has historical roots in both the common
law17 and civil law systems' 8 and was recognized and applied by California
courts 19 long before its codification in 1969.20 Before the doctrine was
(disapproving Velez and holding that the putative spouse doctrine applies to registered domestic
partners), disapproved of by Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. 302 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2013).
16. One example of this piecemeal reactive legislation is in California's treatment and
classification of personal injury damages. See Helen Y. Chang, The Slip and Fall of the
California Legislature in the Classification of Personal Injury Damages at Divorce and Death, I
EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 345, 352 (2009).
17. The common law legal scholar Bracton and canonist Tancred wrote about putative
marriage in the 12th century. "According to the law that they elaborated in the twelfth century,
the impediments to a lawful marriage were so numerous and so secret that it must have been a
common enough event for a man and a woman to believe that they were husband and wife, while
in truth they were living in unlawful concubinage. Some of the evil effects of this unwholesome
law were evaded by a doctrine of putative marriage." 8 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN
SOCIETY 221 221-24 (F.W. Maitland et al. eds., 1894).
18. The putative spouse doctrine was recognized under Spanish law to legitimize children
born to good faith putative spouses. See Casey E. Faucon, Living Separate and Apart: Solving the
Problem of Putative Community Property in Louisiana, 85 TUL. L. REv. 771, 777-79 (2011) citing
Las Siete Partidas pt IV, tit. XIII, law I (Robert 1. Burns ed., Samuel Parsons Scott trans., 2001).
The Las Siete Partidas dates from the thirteenth century. Id. at n.25. The putative spouse doctrine
was also recognized under French law in the Code Napoleon. Id. at 779.
19. See Coats v. Coats, 118 P. 441, 443 (Cal. 1911) (reasoning that wife in good faith
believed she was legally married, and stating: "To say that the woman in such case, even though
she may be penniless and unable to earn a living, is to receive nothing, while the man with whom
she lived and labored in the belief that she was his wife, shall take and hold whatever he and she
have acquired, would be contrary to the most elementary conceptions of fairness and justice.");
see also Jackson v. Jackson, 29 P. 957, 960 (Cal. 1892) (Harrison, J., concurring: It may be
conceded that the parties to this action entered into the contract of marriage under such
circumstances that it was valid to all intents and purposes until annulled by decree of the court; but
the fact that the defendant had at that date a former wife living, from whom he had not been
divorced, gave to the plaintiff the right to have the marriage annulled upon the discovery of such
fact.... Upon its dissolution, there would arise the same equitable grounds for an equal division
of the property that had been acquired by the parties during the existence of the relation of
husband and wife as would exist upon the dissolution of any valid contract of marriage for a cause
other than adultery or extreme cruelty. (citations omitted.)).
20. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 4452, repealed and replaced with CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251.
2014]
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codified, California courts exercised their equitable powers to recognize
marital rights in property acquired by the parties during their putative
relationship.2' Putative spouse status was found if either spouse held a
good faith belief in the existence of a legal marriage.22 Upon such a
finding, the relationship was deemed a "putative marriage" and marital
23property rights flowed to the putative spouses.
California's putative spouse statute was considered a mere codification
of existing judicial decisions24 and absent legislation changing the doctrine,
the courts should be bound by the doctrine of stare decisis. California
courts have applied the putative spouse doctrine inconsistently as to the
various benefits of a legal marriage. This article illustrates those
inconsistencies and recommends that legislature clarify the putative spouse
doctrine. Part I explains the historical origins of the putative spouse
doctrine. Part II sets forth the doctrine's development in California. Part III
discusses the various rights extended to putative spouses. Part TV examines
the application and impact of the putative spouse doctrine for California
21. See Vargas v. Vargas (Estate of Vargas), 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (Ct. App. 1974):
Equity or chancery law has its origin in the necessity for exceptions to the application of rules of
law in those cases where the law, by reason of its universality, would create injustice in the affairs
of men. Equity acts "in order to meet the requirements of every case, and to satisfy the needs of
progressive social condition, in which new primary rights and duties are constantly arising, and
new kinds of wrongs are constantly committed." Equity need not wait upon precedent "but will
assert itself in those situations where right and justice would be defeated but for its intervention."
(citations omitted.)
22. See Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 216 (Cal. 2013) ("[T]he putative
spouse concept [is] a means for enabling a party to an invalid marriage to enjoy certain of the civil
benefits of marriage if he or she believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.")
23. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West 2004). In addition to marital property rights, putative
spouses are entitled to rights of succession at death and support. See Krone v. Krone (In re
Krone's Estate), 189 P.2d 741, 742 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) ("[T]he logic appears irrefutable
that if according to statute the survivor of a valid, ceremonial marriage shall be entitled to take all
of the community estate upon its dissolution, then by parity of reasoning why should not the wife
inherit the entire estate of a putative union upon the death of her husband intestate? Clearly she
does inherit all."); see also Smith v. Garvin (Estate of Leslie), 689 P.2d 133, 140 (Cal. 1984)
(finding that a putative spouse was an intestate heir to the decedent's separate property under the
California Probate Code); Goldberg v. Goldberg (In re Estate of Goldberg), 21 Cal. Rptr 626, 632
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (discussing the intestate succession rights of a surviving putative spouse, the
court said that, "[a]s a putative spouse, Edith is entitled to the same share of the 'community'
property as she would receive as an actual wife").
24. Monti v. Monti (In re Marriage of Monti), 185 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1982):
The Family Law Act codified already existing law regarding the status and property rights of the
putative spouse. "The sections pertaining to void marriage are largely declaratory of existing law
and are not intended to work significant substantive changes.". . . Thus, section 4452 merely
codifies the substantive law existing before 1969 defining a putative spouse. Before that time, it
was well-settled that the essential basis of a putative marriage was a belief in the existence of a
valid marriage. (citations omitted.)
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registered domestic partners. Part V concludes that the putative spouse
doctrine applies to the putative marriage once one spouse qualifies as a
putative spouse regardless of the guilt of the other, and that the doctrine
should be applied in favor of same sex registered domestic partners.
I. ORIGINS OF THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE DOCTRINE
A. Early English Law
Although civil law is generally credited for developing the putative
spouse doctrine, early English law at least as of the twelfth century
recognized the putative spouse doctrine to legitimize children.25  The
doctrine continued to be recognized in the common law of England and in
canon law in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.2 6 According to the
English 13th century jurist Henry of Bracton: "If a woman in good faith
marries a man who is already married, believing him to be unmarried, and
has children by him, such children will be adjudged legitimate and capable
of inheriting. '' 27 Although legitimacy was conferred upon the children born
to putative spouses, English law did not focus on any other civil effects
such as property division or inheritance as between the spouses and,
instead, simply recognized the need for equity in such situations.2 8 The
legitimacy of children born to putative spouses was later cast aside by the
English common law.29
B. Early Spanish Law
Spain first recognized the putative spouse doctrine in the thirteenth
century in Las Siete Partidas otherwise known as "The Seven Books of
Law. 3 °  Although the term "putative spouse" was not used, Las Siete
25. See Blakesley, supra note 5, at 5-6.
26. See 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FRANCIS WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 375-77 (2d ed. 1898).
27. Id. at 376 (quoting Bracton).
28. See Monica Hof Wallace, The Pitfalls of a Putative Marriage and the Callfor a Putative
Divorce, 64 LA. L. REV. 71, 77 (2003) (citing POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 377.).
29. POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 377 n.3 ("The ultimate theory of English
lawyers took no heed of good or bad faith and made the legitimacy of the children depend on the
fact that their parents while living were never divorced.").
30. Marilyn Stone, Las Siete Partidas, THE GOTHAM TRANSLATOR (N.Y. Circle of
Translators, New York, N.Y.), Sept/Oct 2003, available at http://www.nyctranslators.org/gotham-
translator/docs/2003/September-October_2003.pdf.
"Las Siete Partidas" or the Seven Books of Law, were created in the thirteenth century by the
lawyers, theologians and scholars of the court of "the wise king," Alfonso X of Castile and
Leon so that all the people in the diverse provinces of the realm would be governed by the
2014]
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Partidas embraced the concept by conferring legitimacy onto children
whose parents believed in good faith that their otherwise invalid marriage
was valid:
If between those who are married openly in the face of the church, such an
impediment should exist that the marriage must be annulled on account of
it, the children begotten before it was known that an impediment of this
kind existed will be legitimate. This will also be the case where both
parties did not know that such an impediment existed, as well as where
only one of them knew it, for the ignorance of one alone renders the
children legitimate. But if after it had been certainly ascertained that such
an impediment existed between the parties, theq' should have children, all
those born subsequently will not be legitimate.
3
Although the Partidas did not address the division of any marital
property between the spouses, Spanish law recognized the right of a
putative spouse to share in the property acquired during the putative
32
marriage. The doctrine was ameliorative for an innocent putative spouse
but punitive for a wrongful or guilty spouse.33 Spanish law punished the
bigamous spouse by way of branding, imprisonment, banishment, and loss
of property.34 If a bigamous husband died, he forfeited his interest in the
property acquired during the putative marriage and the property was equally
divided between the putative and legal spouse.35 This division of property
did not necessarily benefit the putative spouse because under traditional
Spanish community property principles the innocent spouse already owned
one-half of the property acquired during the putative marriage.36
same laws. Those laws were remarkable because they were written in "romance" rather than
in the customary Latin and they are still used in Spain, Spanish America and the United
States.
Id.
31. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, Part IV., Tit. XIII, Law 1 (Scott trans., Bums ed., 2001).
32. See Wallace, supra note 28, at 78 (citing Smith v. Smith, I Tex. 621, 628 (1846) and
Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, I La. Ann. 98, 106 (1846)).
33. Id.
34. See id. ("That besides the ecclesiastical penalties those marry clandestinely will also be
liable to civil ones; . .. but thus incur the penalty of confiscation of property, banishment, and just
cause of being disinherited." (citing I White, New Recopilacion 45 (1839)); see also id at 242
("The married man who lives in concubinage.., and if she is married, he forfeits the half of his
property.").
35. See id. at 78-79 (citing Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106).
36. See 1 WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK & MICHEAL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 261-62 (2d ed. 1971) ("The Spanish law of community very plainly provided that
'[e]verything the husband or wife may earn during union, let them both have it by halves."').
[Vol. 44
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C. Early French Law
The Code Napoleon, adopted by France in 1804,37 was completed at
the order of Napoleon Bonaparte and became the governing law across
much of Europe during the Napoleonic Wars.38  The Napoleon Code
recognized the putative spouse doctrine in Articles 201 and 202:
Art. 201. A marriage which has been declared null draws after it,
nevertheless, civil consequences, as well with regard to the married parties
as to their children, where the marriage has been contracted in good faith.
Art. 202. Where good faith exists only on the part of one of the married
persons, the marriage is only attended by civil consequences in favor of
such persons, and the children of the marriage. 39
The putative spouse doctrine under the Code Napoleon was different
from Spanish law in several respects. French law did not punish the guilty
or wrongful spouse 40 and even if both spouses were "guilty," their children
were still legitimate.4' Spanish law denied legitimacy to children born to
two guilty spouses.42 Under French law, the civil effects ended when the
putative marriage was declared null but under Spanish law, the civil effects
terminated when the innocent spouse ceased to have a good faith belief in
the existence of a legal marriage.43
Although French legal scholars agreed that a guilty spouse would not
forfeit property rights, they disagreed as to how the marital property should
be apportioned between the legal spouse, the putative spouse, and their
children.44 Denisart, Toullier, and Vazeille advocated an association or
partnership theory which would confer one-half of the property acquired
during the legal marriage to the legal spouse up until the putative
37. L. Kinvin Wroth, Notes for a Comparative Study of the Origins of Federalism in the
United States and Canada, 15 AZ. J. INTL. & CoMP. L. 93, 99 (1998).
38. Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privilege: Hardly a New or Revolutionary
Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 583, 593 (1987).
39. A BARRISTER OF THE INNER TEMPLE, CODE NAPOLEON, LITERALLY TRANSLATED
FROM THE ORIGINAL AND OFFICIAL EDITION 57 (1804).
40. Joseph B. Henderson, Comment, The Civil Effects of a Putative Marriage, 1 LoY. L.
REv. 54, 58 (1941).
41. Id. at 60.
42. Illegitimacy of their children was the punishment for the wrongfulness of the parents.
Id.; see also Wallace, supra note 28, at 78 (citing L. Julian Samuel, The Necessity for the
Continuance of Good Faith in a Putative Marriage, 6 TUL. L. REv. 306, 307 (1932)).
43. Wallace, supra note 28, at 80.
44. Id. at 80-82; see also Faucon, supra note 18, at 779-81.
2014]
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marriage.45 The putative spouse was entitled to one-half of the property
46
acquired during the putative marriage. Each marriage was viewed as a
discrete association or partnership with the common (guilty) spouse.47
French jurist Demolombe disagreed with the association theory, claiming
that a good faith putative spouse would not necessarily receive the effects of
a marital community and instead argued for a liquidation of each
community with an apportionment to each spouse what he/she would
otherwise be entitled under her own property regime.48
The French scholars concurred that the putative spouse could inherit
from the common spouse but that the reverse was not true: the common
spouse could not inherit from the putative spouse.4 9 However, the scholars
disagreed as to the devolution of a decedent common spouse's property
interest among his children. Denisart and Toullier continued to apply an
association theory and took the position that the children of each marriage
were limited to the property acquired by the common spouse during the
time of his marriage to their respective mothers.50 Vazeille espoused more
of a hotchpot theory arguing that all of the children should share equally in
the common spouse's property regardless of the marriage periods.51
The French courts eventually followed the theory of jurists Aubry and
Rau and protected the legal spouse by giving her a share of the property
acquired during the putative marriage since the legal marriage had
continued through the putative marriage.52 The children all shared in the
common spouse's putative property and the remaining one-half of the
putative marital property was divided equally between the legal spouse and
53putative spouse.
Notably, all of the early English, Spanish, and French scholars
approached the putative spouse issue from a gendered perspective: all
assumed a guilty, bigamous, wrongful husband with an innocent unknowing
wife. This male-centric view of putative spouses is an outdated perspective
45. Wallace, supra note 28, at 80 (citing DENISART, 3 COLLECTION DE JURISPRUDENCE 614
(1784); M. TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 665 (4th ed. 1824); M.F.A. VAZEILLE, I
TRAITE DU MARIAGE ET DE LA PUISSANCE PATERNELLE § 285 (1825)).
46. Id. at 81.
47. Id.
48. Id; see also Blakesley, supra note 5 at 17-18.
49. Wallace, supra note 28, at 81.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 7 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 75-76 (5th ed. 1913); Blakesley,
supra note 5, at 17-18.
53. AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 52, at 75-76; Blakesley, supra note 5, at 17-18; Wallace,
supra note 28, at 82.
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in the 21st century, and any new interpretations of the putative spouse
doctrine must reflect gender neutrality without paternalism.
II. THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE DOCTRINE IN CALIFORNIA
The California Family Code defines legal marriage as a "personal
relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to
which the consent of the parties capable of making that contract is
necessary. 54  In addition to consent and capacity, licensure and
solemnization are also required. 5 Although marriage is generally perceived
and accepted as a private and personal decision, the courts have long held
that the state has an important interest in the institution of marriage and
marriage is thus entitled to some regulation.56 State regulations vary but
typically proscribe limits for those who can marry such as age,
57 gender,58
54. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014). Although this section has not been
repealed, its "man and woman" limitation for marriage has been successfully challenged. See
Hollingsworth v. Perr., 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) and related Proposition 8 cases. See also
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that at least a part of the Defense
of Marriage Act's prohibition on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional as violating the equal
protection clause).
55. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014) ("Consent alone does not
constitute marriage. Consent must be followed by the issuance of a license and solemnization as
authorized by this division, [ ].").
56. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) ("Marriage, as creating the most
important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than
any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body
prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to
constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of
both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.").
57. The legal age of marriage in most states is 18. See Naomi Calm and June Carbone, Deep
Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 481 (2007). Most states
permit marriages for certain minors with parental consent and/or judicial consent. See, e.g., 750
ILL.. COMP. STAT, ANN. 5/301 (West 1999).
The court shall enter its judgment declaring the invalidity of a marriage (formerly known as
annulment) entered into under the following circumstances: (1) a party lacked capacity to
consent to the marriage at the time the mamage was solemnized, either because of mental
incapacity or infirmity or because of the influence of alcohol, drugs or other incapacitating
substances, or a party was induced to enter into a marriage by force or duress or by fraud
involving the essentials of marriage; (2) a party lacks the physical capacity to consummate
the marriage by sexual intercourse and at the time the marriage was solemnized the other
party did not know of the incapacity; (3) a party was aged 16 or 17 years and did not have the
consent of his parents or guardian or judicial approval; or (4) the marriage is prohibited.
Id.; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.103 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.02 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-2 (2013) (held unconstitutional by
Fisher-Borne v. Smith, Nos. 1:12CV589, 1:14CV299, 2014 WL 5138914, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct.
14,2014); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7 (McKinney 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.101 (2006)
58. Currently, 37 states have legalized same sex marriage either by legislation, judicial
decision, or popular vote. See PROCONORG, http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?
resourcelD=004857 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
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affinity,59 consanguinity, 60 mental capacity, 6' and physical capacity. 62  In
California, eighteen is the legal age for consent to marry.63 However,
59. States typically prohibit incestuous marriages although some states permit first cousin
marriages. See, e.g., 750 ILL. STAT. ANN. 5/212(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2014) (permitting
marriages between first cousins over the age of 50 years or if one of them is permanently sterile):
The following marriages are prohibited: (1) a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of an
earlier marriage of one of the parties; (2) a marriage between an ancestor and a descendant or
between a brother and a sister, whether the relationship is by the half or the whole blood or by
adoption; (3) a marriage between an uncle and a niece or between an aunt and a nephew, whether
the relationship is by the half or the whole blood; (4) a marriage between cousins of the first
degree; however, a marriage between first cousins is not prohibited if: (i) both parties are 50 years
of age or older; or (ii) either party, at the time of application for a marriage license, presents for
filing with the county clerk of the county in which the marriage is to be solemnized, a certificate
signed by a licensed physician stating that the party to the proposed marriage is permanently and
irreversibly sterile; (5) a marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex; see also CAL. FAM.
CODE § 2200 (West 2004) ("Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendents
of every degree, and between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, and
between uncles and nieces or aunts and nephews, are incestuous, and void from the beginning,
whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2014) ("a. A man shall not marry or enter into a civil union with any of his ancestors or
descendants, or his sister or brother, or the daughter or son of his brother or sister, or the sister or
brother of his father or mother, whether such collateral kindred be of the whole or half blood. b. A
woman shall not marry or enter into a civil union with any of her ancestors or descendants, or her
sister or brother, or the daughter or son of her brother or sister, or the sister or brother of her father
or mother, whether such collateral kindred be of the whole or half blood. c. A marriage or civil
union in violation of any of the foregoing provisions shall be absolutely void."); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 5 (McKinney 2010) ("A marriage is incestuous and void whether the relatives are
legitimate or illegitimate between either: 1. An ancestor and a descendant; 2. A brother and sister
of either the whole or the half blood; 3. An uncle and niece or an aunt and nephew. If a marriage
prohibited by the foregoing provisions of this section be solemnized it shall be void, and the
parties thereto shall each be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hundred dollars and may,
in the discretion of the court in addition to said fine, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six
months. Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully solemnize such marriage, or procure or aid
in the solemnization of the same, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined or
imprisoned in like manner."). In New Jersey, incestuous marriages between consenting adults is
legal. Legislation has been proposed to criminalize certain incestuous relations. See Louis C.
Hochman, Incest Outrage: Bill Would Ban Sex Between Related Adults in N.J., N.J.COM (Jan. 21,
2015), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2015/01/incest-outragebill-would-ban-sex-between_
related.html.
60. See, e.g., CAL. FAM, CODE § 2200; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(a); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 5; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1. Incest is also subject to criminal punishment. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 285 (West 2014) ("Persons being within the degrees of consanguinity within
which marriages are declared by law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry with each other,
or being 14 years of age or older, commit fornication or adultery with each other, are punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison.").
61. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8-4 (LexisNexis 2007) ("A marriage is void if either party
to the marriage was mentally incompetent when the marriage was solemnized."); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-101 (2008) ("In law, marriage is considered a civil contract, to which the consent of the
parties capable of contracting is essential."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-9 ("No marriage license shall
be issued when, at the time of making an application therefor, either applicant is infected with a
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minors can legally marry with the consent of at least one parent and court
approval. 4
Although licensure and solemnization are required for a ceremonial or
formal marriage, other types of marriages may also be legal. 65 An informal
marriage by custom and cohabitation known as a common law marriage is
still permitted in a minority of states.66 Common law marriages generally
require consent, capacity, cohabitation, and conduct. 67  A common
misconception is that the parties must cohabitate for a specified period of
time, but no state requires a minimum duration of cohabitation for a
common law marriage.68 Currently, fifteen states and the District of
venereal disease in a communicable stage, or is a person currently adjudicated mentally
incompetent.").
62. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7 ("A marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction if either party thereto: 1. Is under the age of legal consent, which is
eighteen years, provided that such nonage shall not of itself constitute an absolute right to the
annulment of such marriage, but such annulment shall be in the discretion of the court which shall
take into consideration all the facts and circumstances surrounding such marriage; 2. Is incapable
of consenting to a marriage for want of understanding; 3. Is incapable of entering into the married
state from physical cause; 4. Consent to such marriage by reason of force, duress or fraud; 5. Has
been incurably mentally ill for a period of five years or more."); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/301 ("The court shall enter its judgment declaring the invalidity of a marriage (formerly
known as annulment) entered into under the following circumstances: (1) a party lacked capacity
to consent to the marriage at the time the marriage was solemnized, either because of mental
incapacity or infirmity or because of the influence of alcohol, drugs or other incapacitating
substances, or a party was induced to enter into a marriage by force or duress or by fraud
involving the essentials of marriage; (2) a party lacks the physical capacity to consummate the
marriage by sexual intercourse and at the time the marriage was solemnized the other party did not
know of the incapacity; (3) a party was aged 16 or 17 years and did not have the consent of his
parents or guardian or judicial approval; or (4) the marriage is prohibited."); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3101.06 (West 2011) ("No marriage license shall be granted when either of the applicants
is under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or controlled substance or is infected with syphilis
in a form that is communicable or likely to become communicable.").
63. CAL. FAM. CODE § 301 (West 2004) ("An unmarried male of the age of 18 years or
older, and an unmarried female of the age 18 years or older, and not otherwise disqualified, are
capable of consenting to and consummating marriage.").
64. Id. at § 302 ("(a) An unmarried male or female under the age of 18 years is capable of
consenting to and consummating marriage upon obtaining a court order granting permission to the
underage person or persons to marry. (b) The court order and written consent of the parents of
each underage person, or of one of the parents or the guardian of each underage person, shall be
filed with the clerk of the court, and a certified copy of the order shall be presented to the county
clerk at the time the marriage license is issued.").
65. See Jennifer Thomas, Pitfalls and Promises: Cohabitation, Marriage and Domestic
Partnerships, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 151 (2009).
66. Id.
67. See generally id at 152-60.
68. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS, 211 (4th ed. 2010) ("number of days and nights" sufficient for a common law
marriage) (citing Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Tenn. 1949)).
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Columbia recognize common law marriage under some circumstances.69
States that recognize common law marriage include: Alabama,7°
Colorado,71 Georgia (if created before January 1, 1997),72 Idaho (if created
before January 1, 1996), 73 Iowa,74 Kansas,75 Montana,76 New Hampshire
(for inheritance purposes only),77 Ohio (if created before October 10,
1991), 78 Oklahoma, 79 Pennsylvania (if created before January 1, 2005),80
Rhode Island,8' South Carolina,82 Texas,83 and Utah.84
Several other variations to legal marriages also exist. Five states,
including California,85 permit marriage by proxy-allowing one of the
parties to be represented at the ceremony by an agent or stand-in proxy.86
Two states, California and Michigan, allow for a "confidential" or "secret"
69. Thomas, supra note 65, at 151.
70. Lorren v. Agan, 960 So. 2d. 685, 687-89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
71. In re Marriage of J.M.H., 143 P.3d 1116, 1117 (Colo. App. 2006).
72. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 (2010).
73. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-201 (2006), held unconstitutional by Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-
35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at * 28-29 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014).
74. In re Toom, 710 N.W.2d (Iowa Ct. App. 2005).
75. Bahruth v. Jacobus, 154 P.3d 1184 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
76. Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Syst., 104 P.3d 445, 451 (Mont. 2004).
77. In re Estate of Buttrick, 597 A.2d 74,76 (N.H. 1991).
78. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.12 (West 2011).
79. Davis v. State, 103 P.3d 70, 82 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
80. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (West 2010).
81. DeMelo v. Zompa, 844 A.2d 174, 177 (R.I. 2004).
82. Callen v. Callen, 620 S.E.2d 59, 62-63 (S.C. 2005).
83. Hart v. Webster, No. 03-05-00282-CV, 2006 WL 1707975, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. June 23,
2006).
84. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (LexisNexis 2013); see also Thomas, supra note 65, at 15 1.
California abolished common law marriage in 1895. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist
Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 732 (1996).
85. Andrea B. Carroll, Reviving Proxy Marriage, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 457 (2011). The
five states permitting marriage by proxy are California, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, and Texas.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 420 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109
(West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006 (West 2006
& Supp. 2014); Kan. Op. Att'y Gen., No. 80-261 (Dec. 19, 1980), available at
http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/1980/1980-261 .pdf.
86. Marriage by proxy is often used during times of war. Because of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, California exempted overseas military personnel from actual presence for the licensure
and solemnization requirement of a formal marriage. "[A] member of the Armed Forces of the
Untied States who is stationed overseas and serving in a conflict or a war and is unable to appear
for the licensure and solemnization of the marriage may enter into that marriage by the appearance
of an attorney-in-fact, commissioned and empowered in writing for that purpose through a power
of attorney." CAL. FAM, CODE § 420(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014). California later expanded
proxy marriages for those who are physically unable to appear for the license and solemnization
upon proof of "sufficient reason." See CAL. FAM. CODE § 426 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014).
Sufficient reasons include hospitalization and incarceration. Id
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marriage to avoid any embarrassment for a child born out of wedlock or
pre-marital cohabitation. 7 Other types of legal marriages include marriages
by declaration, 88 marriages by contract,89 and tribal marriages. 90
The putative spouse doctrine is considered a curative device to validate
an otherwise invalid marriage.91  The doctrine is described as "the
proverbial bridge" to the civil effects of a legal marriage for those who fail
87. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 500 (West 2004) ("When an unmarried man and an unmarried
woman, not minors, have been living together as husband and wife, they may be married pursuant
to this chapter ... "); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.201 (West 2005) ("When a person desires
to keep the exact date of his or her marriage to a person of the opposite sex a secret, the judge of
probate may issue, without publicity, a marriage license to any person making application, under
oath, if there is good reason expressed in the application and determined to be sufficient by the
judge of probate."); Ashley E. Rathbun, Marrying Into Financial Abuse: A Solution to Protect the
Elderly in California, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 227, 238 ("California has recognized confidential
marriage since 1878. At the time the legislature codified confidential marriage, society considered
it sinful for couples to live together before marriage.").
88. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-311(1) ("Persons desiring to consummate a marriage by
written declaration in this state without the solemnization provided for in 40-1-301 shall, prior to
executing the declaration, secure the medical certificate required by this chapter. The declaration
and the certificate or the waiver provided for in 40-1-203 must be filed by the clerk of the district
court in the county where the contract was executed."); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (a)
("In a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the marriage of a man and woman may be
proved by evidence that: (1) a declaration of their marriage has been signed as provided by this
subchapter; or (2) the man and woman agreed to be married and after the agreement they lived
together in this state as husband and wife and there represented to others that they were
married.").
89. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11(4) (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2014) ("A written contract of
marriage signed by both parties and at least two witnesses, all of whom shall subscribe the same
within this state, stating the place of residence of each of the parties and witnesses and the date
and place of marriage, and acknowledged before a judge of a court of record of this state by the
parties and witnesses in the manner required for the acknowledgment of a conveyance of real
estate to entitle the same to be recorded.").
90. Mark P. Strasser, Tribal Marriages, Same-Sex Unions And An Interstate Recognition
Conundrum, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 211-12 (2010) ("As a general matter, courts have
held that Native American marriages established in accord with tribal customs and usages were
valid, as long as the marriage involved at least one tribal member and were on Native American
lands."). The recognition of cultural customs as to marriage has also been applied to quakers. See
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 12 (McKinney 2010) ("The preceding provisions of this chapter, so far as
they relate to the manner of solemnizing marriages, shall not affect marriages among the people
called friends or quakers; nor marriages among the people of any other denominations having as
such any particular mode of solemnizing marriages; but such marriages must be solemnized in the
manner heretofore used and practiced in their respective societies or denominations, and marriages
so solemnized shall be as valid as if this article had not been enacted.").
91. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 68, at 213 ("Courts and legislatures often strain to
recognize marriages that fail to comply with the formal requirements. In so doing, they have
developed a variety of curative or mitigative devices - so-called because they cure or mitigate the
harsh consequences of invalidity. The most important of these mitigative devices is the putative
spouse doctrine.").
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in their attempt to do SO. 92  Exercising equitable powers, the courts have
invoked the putative spouse doctrine to protect those who in good faith,
attempted to comply with the formalities required for a legal marriage. 93 In
general, the doctrine applies when at least one of the parties has a good faith
belief in the existence of a legal marriage. 94 Even before its codification by
the California legislature in 1969, the courts applied the doctrine to both
void and voidable marriages.95
A. California Putative Spouse Cases Before the 1970 Codification
One of California's earliest decisions to apply the doctrine is the 1892
case of Jackson v. Jackson.96  In Jackson, the parties married in 1873. 97
Seventeen years later, the wife sought an annulment upon discovery of
another and pre-existing legal wife whom the husband had married and left
behind in Australia.98  The husband admitted that he had legally married
92. Wallace, supra note 28, at 72 ("The putative marriage rule provides the proverbial bridge
to civil effects in the event parties fail in their attempt to contract a valid marriage, believing in
good faith they had done so. The putative marriage rule has been described as 'ameliorative or
corrective,' designed to give innocent spouses to a legally null marriage the civil effects to which
parties in a valid marriage enjoy.").
93. Ben Johnson, Putative Partners: Protecting Couples from the Consequences of
Technically Invalid Domestic Partnerships, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2147, 2162 (2007) ("Courts used
their equitable jurisdiction to protect putative spouses because they recognized that 'equity
demands that innocent persons not be injured through an innocent relationship.' A party declared
to be a putative spouse gains all of the rights and benefits of a legal marriage, and thus the
doctrine is generally invoked during divorce or estate proceedings. The doctrine was originally a
product of the judicial system and was only codified later by state statutes.").
94. Stanley A. Coolidge, Jr., Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 866, 866 (1962) ("A putative marriage is one in which at least one of the parties
has a good faith belief that the relationship existing between them is a valid marriage." (citations
omitted)).
95. Void marriages are void ab initio as compared to voidable marriages which are valid
until adjudicated invalid. See Steve Escalera, California Marital Annulments, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 153, 155 (2000).
Annulment law recognizes two types of invalid marriages. A void marriage contains a defect
deemed by the particular state to be so serious that the union must be considered never to
have taken place. Although a formal annulment proceeding would seem not to be required
for these marriages, a party may still petition the court for a formal judicial record that such a
marriage was void ab initio. A voidable marriage contains a defect that, although not serious
enough to render the marriage auto-matically void, is of such a nature that out of fairness the
state will allow the parties to the marriage (or, in some instances, an interested third party) to
choose whether to ratify the marriage. A formal proceeding to "erase" the marriage is
necessary. A voidable marriage may be ratified by continuing the relationship with
knowledge of the defect.
Id.
96. 29 P. 957, 958 (Cal. 1892).
97. ld. at 957.
98. Id.
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Elizabeth as his first wife. 99 However, he believed Elizabeth was dead
since he had heard no news from her or her family for over seven years
prior to his second marriage in California.100 Upon discovery of the
husband's first marriage to Elizabeth, the second wife requested that the
husband transfer certain real property to her.' °1 Believing the first wife
deceased and, to avoid the making of a will and probate, the husband
complied. 0 2  The parties subsequently discovered that Elizabeth was
alive. 0 3 The second wife sought an annulment and the husband filed a
cross-claim to set aside the transfer deed on the grounds of fraud and/or
mistake. 10 4 The court annulled the marriage, vacated the transfer deed, and
divided the property equally between the husband and the second wife.0 5
Although the court did not specifically refer to the second marriage as a
putative one, the court noted that in the equal division of the transferred real
property there was no other "community property" to be divided between
the parties. 0 6 The court's obvious intent was to treat the second marriage
as if it were a legal marriage and in the community property system. Of
further significance is the concurring opinion which stated that upon
dissolution of the void marriage, "there would arise the same equitable
grounds for an equal division of the property that had been acquired by the
parties during the existence of the relation of husband and wife as would
exist upon the dissolution of any valid contract of marriage for a cause other
than adultery or extreme cruelty.'
110 7
This equitable community property doctrine was again applied in the
1911 case of Coats v. Coats.'0 8 Ida and Lee were married in November
1887.109 After eighteen years together, Lee sought an annulment of the
marriage on the ground of Ida's physical incapacity to enter into the
marriage state. ° After the judgment of annulment became final, Ida filed
an action for a division and share in the property accumulated during their
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The value of the Los Angeles real property deeded to the second wife was $125,000.00.
Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 958.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 959.
106. Id. at 960.
107. Id. (Harrison, J., concurring).
108. 118 P. 441, 444 (Cal. 1911).
109. Id. at 442.
110. Id.
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relationship) 1  Ida was awarded $10,000 and Lee appealed.'12  In
upholding the $10,000 judgment, the California Supreme Court stated that
Ida's "share of the joint accumulations must be measured by what a wife
would receive out of community property on the termination of the
marriage.""' 3  In the absence of a statute directing the division of the
property accumulated during a marriage that is subsequently annulled, the
court applied by analogy community property principles that would
otherwise apply to a legal marriage in the exercise of equity.
Even though it may be true that, strictly speaking, there is no "community
property," where there has not been a valid marriage, the courts may well,
in dividing gains made by the joint efforts of a man and a woman living
together under a voidable marriage which is subsequently annulled, apply,
by analogy, the rules which would obtain with regard to community
property where a valid marriage is terminated by death of the husband or
by divorce. The apportionment of such property between the parties is not
provided by any statute. It must, therefore, be made on equitable
principles. In the absence of special circumstances, such as might arise
through intervening claims of third persons, we can conceive of no more
equitable basis of apportionment than an equal division. Until the making
of the annulment decree, the marriage was valid, and the property in
question was impressed with the community character. Upon annulment,
such property, even though it be no longer community property, should be
divided as community property would have been upon a dissolution of the
marriage by divorce or the death of the husband. 114
Nine years later, the California Supreme Court exercised its equitable
powers again to include a void marriage in the community property
system." 5 In Schneider v. Schneider, Sarah (the wife) filed for divorce on
the ground of cruelty and sought a division of the community property.
116
Sarah and Jacob had married in 1908 and lived together as husband and
wife for eight years." 7 Jacob disputed the division of property because
11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 444-45. ("What she did, she did as a wife, and her share of the joint accumulations
must be measured by what a wife would receive out of community property on the termination of
the marriage. 'The law will not inquire whether the acquisition was by the joint efforts of the
husband and wife, or attempt to adjust their respective rights in proportion to the amount each
contributed thereto. The law will not concern itself with such an inquiry, but will leave the parties
to share in the property in the same proportion as though the marriage contract was what the wife
had every reason to believe it to be, i.e., a valid marriage."').
114. Id at 444 (citations omitted).





their "marriage" was void.118 Although Sarah believed that she had legally
divorced her first husband in 1905, the divorce was invalid which meant
Sarah and Jacob's marriage was void. " 9
The court discussed the common law doctrine of dower120 and
reiterated the rule that a wife's right to dower must be premised on a valid
marriage; a good faith belief in the existence of a legal marriage would not
salvage a dower claim. l After reviewing several Texas cases involving
putative marriages, the court distinguished the community property regime
from the common law marital property system and held the common law
rule "inapplicable" in deciding marital property rights in the community
property regime:
122
This conclusion is dictated by simple justice, for where persons domiciled
in such a jurisdiction, believing themselves to be lawfully married to each
other, acquire property as the result of their joint efforts, they have
impliedly adopted, as is said in the Texas case cited, the rule of an equal
division of their acquisitions, and the expectation of such a division should
not be defeated in the case of innocent persons. 123
The court concluded that Sarah was entitled to an equal division of the
marital property, applying the same rule of property division for legal
marriages. 124 "[W]here a woman is an innocent party to a void marriage
she is entitled to the same interest in property acquired by the parties as if
the marriage were valid."
'125
Subsequent cases continued to apply the same equitable principles to
putative spouses in dissolution and probate proceedings.1 26 The equitable




120. See 28 C.J.S. Dower and Curtesy § 4 ("Dower at common-law and under many statutes
entitles the wife to a life estate, in a certain portion of all the lands of which the husband was
seized or possessed at any time during the marriage, unless she is lawfully barred or has
relinquished the right." (citations omitted).).
121. Schneider, 191 P. 533 at 534 ("In the states where the common-law right of dower exists
it is generally held that a woman, in order to be entitled to dower, must base her claim upon a
legal marriage. In those states if a man has a wife living, and enters into a second marriage, no
matter how innocent of wrongdoing the other party to it may be, nor how gross the deception by
which she enters into the marriage, she is not entitled to dower, not being his lawful wife."
(citation omitted).).
122. Id. at 535.
123. Id. (citing Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Tex. 150 (1905)).
124. Id. at 535-36.
125. Id. at 534.
126. See Feig v. Bank of America, 54 P.2d 3, 7 (Cal. 1936) ("under the plainest principles of
equity" the property as acquired by the putative spouses "should be marked by all the incidents of
community property"); see also Macchi v. LaRocca, 201 P. 143, 144 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921);
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In 1948, the California court recognized the succession rights of a
putative spouse in Estate of Krone.128 Krone was a probate case involving a
putative wife's claim for an intestate share in her deceased husband's estate
against his three children from a former marriage. 129 The children claimed
that the putative wife could not inherit as a "surviving spouse" under the
intestacy provisions of the Probate Code but the court disagreed:
[T]he logic appears irrefutable that if according to statute the survivor of a
valid, ceremonial marriage shall be entitled to take all of the community
estate upon its dissolution, then by parity of reasoning why should not the
wife inherit the entire estate of a putative union upon the death of her
husband intestate? Clearly she does inherit all.13
The effect of Krone was to recognize a putative wife as a legal spouse
for the purpose of succession.' Subsequent cases followed the same
reasoning in recognizing the putative spouse's intestate succession rights. 1
32
The courts continued to expand the equitable putative spouse doctrine to
other legal claims. In the 1957 case of Aubrey v. Folsom, the federal
district court (applying California law) held that a putative spouse was
entitled to federal Social Security benefits as a "widow."' 134 One year later,
a California appellate court held that a putative spouse qualified as an "heir"
under California's Wrongful Death Act. 13
Consistent with contract expectation principles, the equitable putative
spouse doctrine protects the innocent spouse by realizing his or her property
interests as if the parties had been legally married. 136 Towards this end, the
Figoni v. Figoni, 295 P. 339, 340 (Cal. 1931); Taylor v. Taylor, 152 P.2d 480, 485 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1944).
127. Krone v. Krone (In re Krone's Estate), 189 P.2d 741, 743 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 741.
131. Kunakoffv. Woods, 332 P.2d 773, 777 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
132. Mazzenga v. Rosso, 197 P.2d 770, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); In re Foy's Estate, 240
P.2d 685, 686-687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); In re Goldberg's Estate, 21 Cal. Rptr. 626, 632 (Ct. App.
1962).
133. 151 F. Supp. 836, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
134. See Speedling v. Hobby, 132 F. Supp. 833, 835-36 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
135. Kunakoff, 332 P.2d at 778 ("Since an heir of a person is one who is entitled to succeed at
his death to his estate in case of intestacy by virtue of our statutes relative to succession, and since
Manya succeeds to David's estate by virtue of section 201 of the Probate Code, she is David's
heir. As an heir may bring an action for wrongful death under section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and inasmuch as Manya is an heir, she is entitled to maintain the action."). Also, the
Probate Code simply refers to the rights of a "surviving spouse." The inclusion of a putative
spouse for some testamentary rights is by judicial interpretation. See discussion infra Part III.
136. See Estate of Leslie, 689 P.2d at 141-42 ("To accord a surviving putative spouse the
status of "surviving spouse" simply recognizes that a good faith belief in the marriage should put
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courts have consistently required that a putative union be founded upon the
good faith belief in the existence of their legal marriage held by at least one
of the parties. 3 7 The 1970 codification of the putative spouse doctrine was
intended as a codification of existing substantive law and included the
requirement of a good faith belief in the existence of a legal marriage. 138
B. The 1969 Family Law Act (effective 1970)
The codification of the putative spouse doctrine was part of a
comprehensive revision of California's family laws which included the
introduction of no-fault divorce. 139 The 1969 Act made California the first
state to implement no-fault divorce and to eliminate fault as a basis for
obtaining a divorce. 40  Prior to 1970, fault impacted the division of
property in a divorce since the innocent spouse was entitled to a greater
share of the community property.'14  The reasons behind the passage of no-
fault divorce were many. Among the reasons were the need to reduce
acrimony between the spouses, reduce the emotional harm to children,
reduce the need for salacious evidence, reduce domestic violence, and
eliminate the need for perjury. 42 Thus, the principal purpose of no-fault
divorce was not necessarily to promote gender equality, but rather to reduce
hostility and family conflict.
43
Other states quickly followed California's lead, and with so many
states enacting no-fault divorce reform legislation, the movement quickly
the putative spouse in the same position as a survivor of a legal marriage."); see also Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 124 n.18 (Cal. 1976) (" In a putative marriage the parties will arrange their
economic affairs with the expectation that upon dissolution the property will be divided equally. If
a 'guilty' putative spouse receives one-half of the property under section 4452, no expectation of
the 'innocent' spouse has been frustrated.").
137. Coats, 118 P. at 444; Feig, 54 P.2d at 3; Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 200 P.2d 49, 54
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 69 P.2d 845, 847 (Cal. 1937).
138. See In re Marriage of Monti, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 74 ("Thus, section 4452 merely codifies
the substantive law existing before 1969 defining a putative spouse.").
139. Ovvie Miller, California Divorce Reform After 25 Years, 28 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J.
160, 160 (1994) ("The Act represented the first comprehensive revision of the state's divorce law
since the Civil Code of 1872. The legislation was the product of years of study and debate within
and without the California state legislature.").
140. Assemb. Comm. Rep. on A.B. No. 530 & S.B. No. 252,4 Cal. Assemb. (1969).
141. See Arnold v. Arnold, 174 P.2d 674, 676 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946); Belmont v.
Belmont, 10 Cal. Rptr. 227, 233-34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
142. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 15 (1985); Susan Westerburg
Reppy, The End of lnnocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce Law, 17 UCLA L. REV.
1306 (1970); Austin Caster, Wf'hy Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Repeat the Errors of No-Fault
Divorce, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 43,47 (2010).
143. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its
Aftermath, 56 U.CIN. L. REV. 1,4-5 (1987).
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became a revolution.144 The 1970's became known as the "divorce boom"
decade.145 At the core of the no-fault concept was the equal division of
community property at divorce regardless of fault. 46  Although no-fault
divorce was heralded as a fresh and modem approach to the anachronistic
and punitive fault based divorce, no-fault divorce was and remains
controversial, in particular as to its alleged impact on the feminization of
poverty, the high divorce rate, and declining moral standards.
47
The newly enacted putative spouse statute was deemed a mere
codification of existing law and the courts continued to require a good faith
belief in the existence of a legal marriage for putative spouse status.148 The
codification of the putative spouse doctrine was discussed in In re Marriage
of Cary.149  In Cary, Janet and Paul lived together for eight years, held
themselves to others as husband and wife, had four children together, filed
joint income tax returns, and acquired property together but never legally
married.150 In a broad interpretation of the putative spouse statute, the Cary
court held that the non-marital partners were within the scope of the
putative spouse statute.' 5' As for the requirement of a good faith belief in
the existence of a legal marriage for putative spouse status, the court noted,
"We should be obliged to presume a legislative intent that a person, who by
deceit leads another to believe a valid marriage exists between them, shall
be legally guaranteed half of the property they acquire even though most, or
all, may have resulted from the earnings of the blameless partner."' 5 2 The
court went on to state that "guilt" or "innocence" of the parties was
irrelevant under the Family Law Act's no-fault regime; the marital property
was equally divided. 3 Cary recognized that once one of the spouses has
144. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
79, 82-83 (1991).
145. Caster, supra note 142, at 48.
146. Chang, supra note 16, at 352.
147. Id. at 352-354.
148. See In re Marriage of Monti, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75 ("The codification of the putative
spouse doctrine was not intended to make substantive changes to the case law before the
enactment of the Family Law Act in 1969."); see also Vryonis v. Vryonis (In re Marriage of
Vryonis), 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 811-12 (Ct. App. 1988).
149. Cary v. Cary (In re Marriage of Cary), 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1973).
150. Id. at 864.
15 1. Id. at 862 ("The relationship between Paul, Janet, and their children must reasonably be
deemed that of a Family, coming within the broad purview of the Family Law Act.").
152. Id. at 865-66.
153. Id. ("Nor may any 'guilt' or 'innocence' of the parties in their relationship after entering
the illegitimate union be considered by the court. Sections 4452, 4509 and 4800 assure that the
parties, without 'punishment' or 'reward' to either, shall receive an equal division of that which
would have been community property had they been validly married.").
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the requisite good faith belief, their relationship then qualifies as a putative
marriage. 154 The guilt of one spouse does not disqualify the putative status
of the marriage.' 55  The California Supreme Court later rejected Cary's
holding that non-marital partners were within the scope of California's
community property system. 1
56
C. The Requirement of a Good Faith Belief in a Legal Marriage
Prior to the codification of the putative spouse doctrine in 1969,
California cases addressing the good faith requirement required only that at
least one of the spouses hold a genuine or subjectively honest belief in the
existence of a legal marriage. 57 Objective reasonableness in the existence
of a legal marriage was not required.' 58
After codification of the putative spouse doctrine, the courts further
defined the requirement of good faith to require that the belief in the
existence of a legal marriage be objectively reasonable and not merely
subjective.'5 9 "Good faith belief' is a legal term of art, and in both the civil
and criminal law a determination of good faith is tested by an objective
standard. 60 In Vryonis, the court held that the alleged wife's belief was not
reasonable since the parties had never attempted to comply with the
formalities for a legal marriage in California. 16 1  Vyronis was the first
California case post-codification to require an objectively reasonable good
faith belief in the existence of a legal marriage.
62
154. Cary's inclusion of non-martial partners in California's community property system was
later rejected by the California Supreme Court in the famous Marvin v. Marvin case. Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) ("No language in the Family Law Act addresses the
property rights of nonmarital partners, and nothing in the legislative history of the act suggests
that the Legislature considered that subject. The delineation of the rights of nonmantal partners
before 1970 had been fixed entirely by judicial decision; we see no reason to believe that the
Legislature, by enacting the Family Law Act, intended to change that state of affairs.").
155. In re Marriage of Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
156. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
157. Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank of Sacramento, 3 P.2d 307, 308 (Cal. 1931) (belief must
be "bona fide"); Sutton v. Sutton, 303 P.2d 21, 23 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1956) (belief must be
"honestly" held); Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (Cal. 1943) (belief in a legal marriage
must be "genuine").
158. Vallera, 134 P.2d at 763.
159. Guo v. Sun (In re Marriage of Guo & Sun), 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 911 (2010).
disapproved by Ceja v. Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2013).
160. See Vryonis v. Vryonis (In re Marriage of Vryonis), 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 813 (Ct. App.
1988) ("Without question, the hallmark of the law is reasonableness, and '[r]easonableness,' of
course, is an objective standard, requiring more than good faith." (quoting In re Arias, 725 P.2d
664, 696 (Cal. 1986))).
161. Id. at 812.
162. Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211,218 (Cal. 2013).
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A proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would
cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of
a valid marriage. Where there has been no attempted compliance with the
procedural requirements of a valid marriage, and where the usual indicia
of marriage and conduct consistent with a valid marriage are absent, a
belief in the existence of a valid marriage, although sincerely held, would
be unreasonable and therefore lacking in good faith. '63
The requirement of an objective good faith belief in a legal marriage
was reiterated in Centinela Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court.'64
In Centinela, the alleged putative husband claimed a good faith belief in the
existence of a common law marriage. 165 Since California abolished
common law marriages in 1895, the court held that the alleged husband
could not have held an objectively reasonable good faith belief in the
existence of a lawful marriage.1 66 Likewise in Welch v. State,167 the court
rejected an alleged putative common law wife as a wrongful death heir,
reiterating that "putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a
reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a valid
marriage.' 68 "[A] subjective good faith belief in a valid marriage by itself,
even when held by a credible and sympathetic party, is not sufficient."' 169
In 2013, the California Supreme Court rejected the requirement of an
objectively reasonable good faith belief in the existence of a legal marriage
for putative spouse status.170  In Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., Nancy
brought a wrongful death claim against the defendant claiming she was the
putative spouse of the decedent. 17' The defendant challenged her standing
for wrongful death purposes, arguing that she was not a putative spouse
because she did not have an objectively reasonable good faith belief that her
marriage to the decedent was legal. 72 Since the purpose of the putative
spouse doctrine is to "protect the expectations of innocent parties and to
achieve results that are equitable, fair, and just," and since pre-codification
163. In re Marriage of Vyronis, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
164. 263 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1989).
165. Id.
166. Id ("Willis's belief was unreasonable as California abolished common law marriage in
1895 .... Without some effort to comply with Civil Code sections 4100 and 4200, supra, Willis's
indicia, standing alone, are insufficient to support a reasonable, good faith belief in a lawful
California marriage.").
167. 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Ct. App. 2000).
168. Id. at 432.
169. Id.
170. Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 215 (Cal. 2013).
171. On September 9, 2007, Robert Ceja was killed in an accident on a construction site. Id.
172. The plaintiff knew of the decedent's prior marriage but signed a marriage license in
which the decedent falsely represented that he had not been married before. Id. at 213.
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cases did not adhere to an objective reasonable standard, the California
Supreme Court concluded that only a subjective good faith belief in the
existence of a legal marriage is required. 173 Although the court rejected a
reasonable person test, the court explained that the reasonableness of the
alleged spouse's belief could nevertheless be considered to assess
credibility.
174
D. Meretricious Partners Are Not Putative Spouses
The Cary decision left a blurry legal line between meretricious partners
and legal spouses by including cohabitants as putative spouses. The Cary
holding was reiterated in 1975 in the Estate of Atherley.175 In Atherley, the
husband died survived by a legal wife and a putative wife.1 76 Although the
court incorrectly identified the second wife as a "putative spouse and as a
"meretricious partner,' ' 177 the court nevertheless stated that "in a putative
marriage a "guilty" spouse is treated the same as an "innocent" spouse; that
is, the property at issue is divided as if the marriage were valid...., 78
Although the guilt or innocence of a putative spouse did not affect the equal
division of property, Atherley continued the conflation of meretricious
partners and putative spouses.
In 1970, the California Supreme Court clarified the distinction between
putative spouses and meretricious partners in the celebrity case involving
actor Lee Marvin and his then live-in girlfriend Michelle Triola.179  In
Marvin v. Marvin,8° the California Supreme Court addressed the
requirements for putative spouse status and discussed the decision In re
173. Id. at216.
174. Id. at 221 ("The good faith inquiry is a subjective one that focuses on the actual state of
mind of the alleged putative spouse. While there is no requirement that the claimed belief be
objectively reasonable, good faith is a relative quality and depends on all relevant
circumstances ... ").
175. 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1975).
176. Id. at 44.
177. The Atherley court's conflation of "putative spouse" and "meretricious partner" is based
upon Cary's erroneous conclusion that meretricious partners are treated the same as putative
partners and entitled to an equal division of the property. "We agree with Cary's holding that a
meretricious spouse now has the same property rights as putative spouse." Id. at 48. This holding
was subsequently been rejected by the California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
178. Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
179. When their relationship ended, Michelle claimed that she and Lee Marvin had an oral
agreement that she would give up her lucrative career as an entertainer and singer to devote her
full-time to defendant as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook in exchange for his
promise to financially support her for life. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
180. Id.
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Marriage of Cary.1 8 1  The Marvin court explained the historical
development and different legal treatment for putative spouses versus
meretricious partners. 8 2  Prior to 1970, the courts fashioned equitable
remedies for putative spouses but limited non-marital partners to express
contracts not based upon meretricious services; the courts had historically
refused to recognize implied contracts for non-marital partners.'8 3 The
Marvin court noted the substantial increase in the number of couples living
together without marrying and that the failure of the courts to recognize an
implied contract or equitable rights between non-marital partners contrasted
with the judicial treatment of putative spouses. 114 Prior to the codification
of the putative spouse doctrine, the courts fashioned a variety of equitable
remedies for putative spouses including those based upon implied contract
and quantum meruit. 185  Although the Marvin court rejected Michele's
argument for palimony support, the court went on to hold that meretricious
partners could enter into valid contracts inter se and assert equitable
remedies against each other.1
86
The Marvin decision was a media sensation and was discussed and
dissected in numerous newspapers and magazines. 1 7 "Palimony" became a
181. Cary v. Cary (In re Marriage of Cary), 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1973). The
California Supreme Court in Marvin ultimately rejected the reasoning in Cary which permitted an
equal division of the accumulated property between non-marital partners based upon the equal
division rule in the Family Law Act. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 120.
182. See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116-22. Although other states use "meretricious" to refer to
unmarried cohabitating couples who have not attempted to get legally married, the California
courts appear to use the term in reference to prostitution. See Zoppa v. Zoppa, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d
901, 905 n.3 (Ct. App. 2001). Interestingly, other states have recognized a far broader definition
of the word "meretricious" and have held that it covers couples cohabiting without the benefit of
matrimony. See, e.g., Milburn v. Milburn, 694 N.E.2d 738, 740; (Ind. Ct. App.1998); Connell v.
Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Sutton v. Widner (In re the Meretricious
Relationship), 85 Wash. App. 487, 933 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Ct. App. 1997). But, as noted both in
the passage quoted earlier from Marvin and from the authority cited in this paragraph, that is not
the definition recognized in this state.
183. Marvin, 557P.2dat 118.
This failure of the courts to recognize an action by a nonmantal partner based upon implied
contract, or to grant an equitable remedy, contrasts with the judicial treatment of the putative
spouse. Prior to the enactment of the Family Law Act, no statute granted rights to a putative
spouse. The courts accordingly fashioned a variety of remedies by judicial decision. Some
cases permitted the putative spouse to recover half the property on a theory that the conduct
of the parties implied an agreement of partnership of joint venture. Others permitted the
spouse to recover the reasonable value of rendered services, less the value of support
received. Finally, decisions affirmed the power of a court to employ equitable principles to
achieve a fair division of property acquired during putative marriage. (citations omitted.)
Id.
184. Id. at 109-10.
185. Id. at 112-15.
186. Id. at 122.
187. Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1381 (2001).
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household word and Michele's attorney Marvin Mitchelson became known
as Hollywood's premier divorce attorney and later represented celebrities
Sonny Bono, Tony Curtis, Joan Collins, Bianca Jagger, Carl Sagan, and
Connie Stevens. 188  Although Michele lost her case in the California
courts, 89 the door to the rights of unmarried cohabitants was now opened
and the legal distinction between putative spouses and unmarried
cohabitants became even more important since putative spouses are in
California's community property system and unmarried cohabitants are not.
E. The 1992 Amendment
The 1992 amendment of the putative spouse statute is codified in
Family Code section 2251 and left its predecessor largely unchanged.' 90 If
a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either or both parties
believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall "declare
the party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse. . 191 Upon a
determination of putative spouse status, any property acquired during the
putative marriage which would have been community property (if the
marriage had been legal) is termed "quasi-marital property" and divided as
if such property were community property. 192  Although the 1992
amendment was not a substantive change, 93 two California appellate courts
interpreted the exact same statutory language diametrically.
188. See Linda Deutsch, Marvin Mitchelson, 76; was Divorce Attorney for the Stars,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/
obituaries/articles/2004/09/20/marvin mitchelson76 was divorce attorneyfor the stars/;
Dennis McLellan, Marvin Mitchelson, 76, Attorney, Pioneered Concept of Palimony, L.A. Times
(Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2004/sep/20/local/me-mitchelson2O.
189. Marvinv. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1981).
190. 1994 Family Code, 23 Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Reports 251 (1993) ("Section 2251
continues the first three sentences of former Civil Code Section 4452 without substantive change.
A reference to the division governing property division has been substituted for the narrower
reference to former Civil Code Section 4800. This is not a substantive change.").
191. Cal. Fam. Code § 2251 (West 2004) ("(a) If a determination is made that a marriage is
void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the
marriage was valid, the court shall: (1) Declare the party or parties to have the status of a putative
spouse. (2) If the division of property is in issue, divide, in accordance with Division 7
(commencing with Section 2500), that property acquired during the union which would have been
community property or quasi-community property if the union had not been void or voidable. This
property is known as "quasi-marital property". (b) If the court expressly reserves jurisdiction, it
may make the property division at a time after the judgment.").
192. Id.
193. See Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211,216 (Cal. 2013).
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In 1997, Xiao Hua Sun aka David Sun, a famous Italian/Chinese opera
singer, met Xia Guo and began dating. 9 4 Ms. Guo knew that Mr. Sun was
married and that his wife and two children lived in Italy. 195 Nevertheless,
Mr. Sun and Ms. Guo relocated to the United States and cohabitated
together for the next five years.' 96 They decided to get married but first Mr.
Sun needed to obtain a divorce from his wife. 197 Together they retained
attorney Tonnie Cheng to file for a dissolution of Mr. Sun's marriage.' 98
Ms. Guo completed the necessary paperwork for the dissolution and both
parties apparently believed that the divorce was final.' 99 On February 14,
2001, Mr. Sun and Ms. Guo were "married" in Las Vegas. 200 Each believed
that Mr. Sun's Italian marriage had been properly dissolved.2' Their
marriage certificate was recorded on February 15, 2001 and issued on
February 23, 2001.202
Unbeknownst to either of them, attorney Cheng did not file the
dissolution papers until February 15, 2001, and the final judgment of
dissolution was not filed until August 21, 2001.203 Apparently, neither Mr.
Sun nor Ms. Guo realized the legal significance of the filing date since they
continued to live together as a married couple.20 4 Indeed, Ms. Guo applied
for Mr. Sun's immigration green card on the basis of their marriage; the
green card was later issued in 2003.205
In 2007, after six years of living together as a married couple, Ms. Guo
filed for divorce.20 6 In 2008, Ms. Guo amended her petition to seek an
annulment.20 7 Mr. Sun claimed that theirs was a putative marriage based
upon their good faith belief in the validity of their marriage. 20 ' The trial
court found that Mr. Sun did not hold an objectively reasonable good faith
belief in the validity of his marriage to Ms. Guo and therefore denied him
194. Opening Brief of Appellant at 2, Gun v. Sun (In re Marriage of Guo & Sun), 112 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 906 (2010) (No. B215995).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. ld. at 3.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 5.
203. Id. at 5-6.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 5-6.
206. Id. at 6.
207. Id. at 7.
208. Id. at 9.
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putative spouse status. 2°9  In particular, because Mr. Sun was the party
seeking putative spouse status, the trial court required him to hold the
required good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. The trial court
found that Mr. Sun did not have the requisite good faith belief and denied
him putative spouse status.210 Mr. Sun appealed and claimed that the court
erred in failing to consider Ms. Guo's good -faith belief in the validity of the
marriage.2 ' The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed.212
The court of appeals reiterated the equitable nature of the putative
spouse doctrine and purpose to protect innocent spouses.
[T]he statute is based on equitable principles and is meant to protect an
innocent party who in good faith believed a marriage was valid. Hence, if
Guo in good faith believed that the marriage was valid-as Sun
contends-then the statute is meant to protect her. But she does not seek
the statute's protection. Thus whether Guo had a good faith belief in the
validity of the marriage is irrelevant to Sun's putative spouse claim.
213
The court's interpretation of section 2251 is incorrect and unworkable.
The plain language of the statute provides that if: "the court finds that either
party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the
court shall: (1) Declare the party or parties to have the status of a putative
spouse. 21 4 If the putative spouse doctrine is indeed meant to protect an
innocent spouse to give him or her the benefit of an expectation in a valid
marriage, putative spouse status must be granted if either spouse holds a
good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. For example, if Bigamous
Husband marries Innocent Wife, the Guo and Sun court would hold that
only the Innocent Wife can seek putative spouse status. If Innocent Wife
claims putative spouse status at divorce, all of the property, including their
earnings and retirement contributions acquired during their putative
marriage would be characterized as quasi-marital property and divided
equally. If Innocent Wife does not claim putative spouse status, Bigamous
Husband cannot and the property acquired during their "marriage" would
209. Guo v. Sun (In re Marriage of Guo & Sun), 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 909 (Ct. App. 2010),
disapproved by Ceja v. Sletten Inc., 302 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2013) (on the grounds that an objective
good faith belief in the existence of a legal marriage is not required).
210. ldat9ll.
211. Idat909-10.
212. The court of appeals found there was substantial evidence that Mr. Sun did not have a
reasonable good faith belief in the validity of his marriage to Ms. Guo. Mr. Sun challenged the
trial court's finding but also claimed that the court erred in not considering Ms. Sun's belief in the
validity of their marriage. Further, the court found no error in the trial court's interpretation of the
putative spouse statute. Id. at 908.
213. Id. at 913.
214. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251(a)(1) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
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presumably be divided according to common law rules of title and
contribution. Allowing Bigamous Husband to claim putative spouse status
simply gives Innocent Wife what she expected from a legal marriage. Any
other rule leads to arbitrary results and is inconsistent with California's no-
fault system.
Such was the conclusion of the California Sixth Appellate District
Court of Appeals in Marriage of Tejeda.2" 5 In Tejeda, the bigamous
husband and innocent wife were in a putative marriage for over thirty
216years. When the husband petitioned for dissolution, the wife petitioned
for a nullification and requested that property titled in her name be
confirmed as her separate property.1 7 The Tejeda court found the putative
spouse statute "clear and unambiguous. 218  The court held that upon a
finding that one spouse has a good faith belief in the existence of a legal
marriage, the union itself becomes a putative marriage.2 19 The property
acquired during the putative marriage although titled in the innocent wife's
name, was then characterized as quasi-marital property and divided equally
between the putative spouses. 220 At first blush, this result may appear to
give the bigamous husband a windfall but in fact, this property division
merely gives the innocent wife what she expected from a legal marriage -
equal division of the marital property. Indeed, the Tejeda court specifically
rejected an interpretation of the putative spouse statute that would limit the
doctrine to innocent spouses only.
221
In reaching its decision, the Tejeda court considered both related
222statutes and the purpose of the putative spouse doctrine. First the court
considered sections 2254 and 2255 of the California Family Code. Section
2254 permits an order for support for an innocent putative spouse.22 3
Section 2255 provides for attorney's fees and costs to innocent putative
224spouses. Since the Legislature singled out the "innocent" party in
providing for fees, and likewise singled out the "putative spouse" in
providing for support, but did not limit quasi-marital property division to an
innocent spouse, the Tejeda court concluded that the Legislature intended





220. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the property was quasi-
marital property. See id. at 364.
221. Id at369.
222. Id at 368-69.
223. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2254 (West 2004).
224. Id. at § 2255.
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for an equal division of the marital property even if one of the spouses was
"guilty. , ,225
The Tejeda court next addressed the statutory purpose of the putative
spouse doctrine and stated:
Disregarding guilt and innocence in property division also serves to
support the purposes of the Family Law Act. The main focus of the act
was to eliminate the artificial fault standard. The basic substantive change
in the law engendered by the act was the elimination of fault or guilt as
grounds for granting or denying divorce and for refusing alimony and
making unequal division of community property. The equal division of
community property was one of the ways of advancing the act's primary
no-fault philosophy. The equal division of quasi-marital property likewise
serves those purposes.226
The Tejeda court continues the historical understanding of the putative
spouse doctrine which is to include the putative union in the community
property system and fulfill the parties' expectations of a legal marriage.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Guo and Sun case is simply
wrong in its interpretation of the putative spouse statute.
III. A PUTATIVE SPOUSE'S RIGHTS TO THE INCIDENTS OF A LEGAL
MARRIAGE
The classic putative spouse doctrine is designed to accord all of the
civil rights, privileges, and benefits of a legal marriage to the putative
marriage.227  Although California includes putative spouses in its
community property system for an equal division of property, California's
treatment of putative spouses is not a classic or pure application of the
doctrine. 228 Property acquired by putative spouses is called "quasi-marital"
property because true community property can only exist when there is a
legal marriage.229  By contrast, Louisiana establishes the exact same
community property rights for putative spouses as legally married spouses
rather than using an equivalent or analogue. 230  Although California
provides for an equal division of the marital property, not all of the other
civil effects of a legal marriage necessarily flow to putative spouses.231 For
225, In re Marriage of Tejeda, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 368-69.
226. Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
227. Blakesley, supra note 5, at 2.
228. Id. at 32-34.
229. Id. at 33.
230. Id. at 31.
231. Id. at 33-34.
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these other "marital" benefits, California courts have interpreted the statutes
to exclude the guilty spouse.
A. Wrongful Death
Even before the putative spouse doctrine was codified, California
courts recognized that a putative spouse had standing to bring a wrongful
death claim. 232  Since a putative spouse is an heir for purposes of
succession, she is an heir for purposes of maintaining an action for
wrongful death.2 3 As of 1975, California specifically included putative
spouses in its wrongful death statute.234 The most recent version of the
California's wrongful death statute provides that a wrongful death action
may be brought by a decedent's "putative spouse" if he or she was
dependent on the decedent and held a good faith belief in the existence of a
legal marriage.235 California's wrongful death statute requires that the
putative spouse meet two requirements for standing: (1) dependency, and
(2) good faith.236 These two requirements are not required for legally
married couples.237 By contrast, a putative spouse in Louisiana need not
establish dependency in order to recover in a wrongful death action.238
As to the requisite good faith belief in the existence of a legal marriage,
the California Supreme Court recently concluded that objective
reasonableness was not required.239  An honest subjective belief in the
existence of a legal marriage is sufficient to qualify one as a putative
spouse.24°
At first glance, the exclusion of a guilty putative spouse from standing
to bring a wrongful death action seems just since a guilty spouse should not
profit from his or her deceit.241 However, the guilty spouse is recovering
nothing more than what the innocent spouse would have expected for the
232. Kunakoffv. Woods, 332 P.2d 773, 778 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
233. Id.
234. Blakesley, supra note 5, at 44.
235. CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE § 377.60(b).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366 (La. 1975).
239. Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 221 (Cal. 2013).
240. Id.
241. See Janet LaTourette, California Family Code § 2251 Adds Insult to Injury by Telling a
Putative Spouse That Not Only is He or She Not Married, But the Person Who Deceived Him or
Her is Entitled to an Equal Division of the Property Despite the Deception, 32 WEST. ST. U. L.
REV. 255 (2005) (arguing that an equal division of the quasi-marital property upon dissolution is a
"windfall" to the guilty spouse).
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surviving spouse from the existence of a legal marriage. Moreover, as a no-
fault divorce state, "guilt" should be irrelevant.
B. Intestate Succession
California courts have historically permitted putative spouses an
intestate share of the decedent spouse's estate.242 The California Probate
Code is replete with references to the rights of the "surviving spouse" but
does not specify whether a putative spouse qualifies as a surviving spouse
for purposes of intestate succession.2 43  In 1962, the court held that a
surviving putative spouse was entitled "to the same share of the
'community' property as she would receive as an actual wife. ' 2 44 In 1984,
the California Supreme Court definitively held that a putative spouse was
entitled to succeed to an intestate share of the decedent spouse's separate
property.245 Although the court did not distinguish between innocent and
guilty putative spouses, the court seems to imply that only innocent putative
spouses would qualify for intestate succession. "To accord a surviving
putative spouse the status of 'surviving spouse' (under the Probate Code)
simply recognizes that a good faith belief in the marriage should put the
putative spouse in the same position as a survivor of a legal marriage. 246
Guilty putative spouses do not qualify for succession rights to a decedent
spouse's estate. Although this appears to be a fair outcome, the exclusion
of a guilty putative spouse as an intestate heir to the innocent spouse's
estate contravenes the innocent spouse's expectation in the existence of a
legal marriage. The innocent spouse's expectation is that his or her
surviving spouse is an intestate heir.
C. Family Allowance
Pursuant to section 6450 of the California Probate Code, the "surviving
spouse" of a decedent is entitled to a "family allowance" during the
administration of the estate.247 The purpose of the family allowance is to
provide for the support of the persons designated in the statute during the
242. Smith v. Garvin (Estate of Leslie), 689 P.2d 133, 145 (Cal. 1984).
243. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 100-02 (West 2002); §§ 6401-6402 (West 2009); §§ 11445-46,
13650, & 13656 (West 1991).
244. Goldberg v. Goldberg (In re Estate of Goldberg), 21 Cal. Rptr. 626, 632 (Ct. App. 1962).
245. Estate of Leslie, 689 P.2d at 145.
246. Id. at 141-42.
247. Section 6540, subdiv. (a) provides that a surviving spouse is "entitled to such reasonable
family allowance out of the estate as is necessary for [the spouse's] maintenance ... during
administration of the estate .. " CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540 (West 2009).
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period between the decedent's death and the distribution of the estate.248
Since the family allowance is a purely statutory creation intended to provide
temporary support to dependents pending probate administration, the term
"surviving spouse" has been construed narrowly to exclude putative
spouses.249
Although a putative spouse may have been wholly dependent upon a
decedent spouse for many years, the Probate Code meanly excludes both
innocent and guilty putative spouses from any temporary support during
probate administration. Putative spouses have most certainly agreed inter
se, to support each other. The exclusion of putative spouses from receiving
a family allowance makes little sense given its purpose and the wide
discretion given to the probate court in deciding the amount and duration of
the award.25° We are also left with an inconsistency in the interpretation of
a "surviving spouse" under the Probate Code. Illogically, a putative spouse
qualifies as a "surviving spouse" for purposes of intestate succession but
does not qualify as a "surviving spouse" for purposes of the family
allowance while waiting for estate administration to end so that they can
inherit.251
D. Spousal Support
Section 2254 of the California Family Code specifically provides for
support to a putative spouse:
The court may, during the pendency of a proceeding for nullity of
marriage or upon judgment of nullity of marriage, order a party to pay for
the support of the other party in the same manner as if the marriage had
not been void or voidable if the party for whose benefit the order is made
is found to be a putative spouse.
The California Supreme Court even awarded permanent support to a
good faith putative spouse when there was a suggestion of fraud committed
248. Parson v. Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1996).
249. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Kelley (In re Estate of Anderson), 137 Cal. Rptr. 727, 730 (Ct.
App. 1977), superseded by statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.02; Hafner v. Hafner (In re Estate of
Hafner), 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 691 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he Legislature did not provide for a family
allowance for a putative spouse ... ").
250. The probate court has a wide discretion in making an order for a family allowance,
including its amount and duration. Fawcett v. Pinney (In re Estate of Fawcett), 43 Cal. Rptr. 160,
171 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
251. Inre Estate of Hafner, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 688, 691.
252. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2254 (West 2004).
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by the guilty spouse to induce the innocent spouse into the marriage.253
Support awards appear limited to innocent or good faith putative spouses.254
Here again is a resulting inconsistency: California's wrongful death
statute specifically limits claimants to good faith putative spouses but the
requirement of good faith does not appear in section 2254 regarding the
payment of support to a putative spouse yet the courts have implied the
requirement of good faith for support. If the definition of a "putative
spouse" requires good faith or innocence, then certainly there was no need
to include those words in the wrongful death statute.
E. Attorney's Fees and Costs
Section 2255 of the California Family Code provides that the court
may order the payment of attorney's fees and costs to the innocent putative
spouse in "proceedings to have the marriage adjudged void and in those
proceedings based upon [a] voidable marriage. .,25 The spouse applying
for such fees and costs must be "innocent of fraud or wrongdoing in
inducing or entering into the marriage, and free from knowledge of the then
existence of any prior marriage or other impediment to the contracting of
the marriage for which the a judgment of nullity is sought., 256
Section 2255 is another example of California's patchwork legislation
regarding putative spouses. If the definition of a "putative spouse" is
limited to innocent spouses, section 2255 could have simply permitted the
recovery for "putative spouses" rather than setting forth the requirement of
innocence. The statutes pertaining to putative spouses are inconsistent.
IV. CALIFORNIA REGISTERED DOMESTIC PARTNERS
A. Background
In 1999, California became the first state to create a domestic partner
25
registry.  Effective January 1, 2000, registered participants were granted
certain limited rights analogous to married couples upon registration.258
253. See Spellens v. Spellens, 317 P.2d 613, 622 (Cal. 1957).
254. See Blakesley, supra note 5, at 41.
255. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2255 (West 2004).
256. Id.
257. The California domestic partners registry was created under A.B. 26, 1999 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1999) (codified as amended at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (West 2004)).
258. A.B. 205, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. § l(a) (Cal. 2003) ("This act is intended to help
California move closer to fulfilling the promises of inalienable rights, liberty, and equality
contained in Sections 1 and 7 of Article 1 of the California Constitution by providing all caring
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While lacking full equal status as legally married couples, the domestic
partner legislation created awareness as to the developing legal status of
same-sex couples.259 This domestic partner legislation was among the most
generous set of rights to be established for same-sex couples nationwide.
260
In 2001, Assembly Bill 25 added additional rights to the domestic partner
legislation: registered domestic partners had standing to sue for wrongful
death, could adopt each other's children, and inter alia, were treated the
same as married spouses under group health care plans.261 Over the next
two years, additional legislation continued to expand the rights of registered
domestic partners.262
In 2003, California passed a broad comprehensive statute for registered
domestic partners titled the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities
Act of 2003.263 The Bill, which was codified in California Family Code
section 297.5, provides:
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and
benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and
duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative
regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other
provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon
264
spouses.
The new law was significant in: (1) including registered domestic
partners in California's community property system; and, (2) the law
applied retroactively to include those already registered as domestic
265partners.   Essentially, the new law was intended to provide domestic
partners with almost all of the rights given to married couples.266 The new
law also meant that California's sometimes-complex community property
and committed couples, regardless of their gender or sexual orientation, the opportunity to obtain
essential rights, protections, and benefits and to assume corresponding responsibilities,
obligations, and duties and to further the state's interests in promoting stable and lasting family
relationships, and protecting Californians from the economic and social consequences of
abandonment, separation, the death of loved ones, and other life crises.").
259. See Johnson, supra note 93, at 2155.
260. Ryan M. Deam, Creating the Perfect Case: The Constitutionality of Retroactive
Application of the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
733, 743 (2008). Opposite sex partners over the age of 62 may also register as domestic partners.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(4)(B) (West 2004).
261. A.B. 25, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
262. See Deam, supra note 260, at 745.
263. A.B. 205, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (codified as amended at CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 297-299.6 (West 2004)). Section 2 of the bill dubs the act the Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 2003. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id; see also, Deam, supra note 260, at 746.
266. Johnson, supra note 93, at 2160.
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laws would now apply to registered domestic partners but the precise details
of such application remained open. One example is whether California's
putative spouse doctrine applies to domestic partners.
B. Putative Domestic Partners
In Velez v. Smith,267 the First District Court of Appeal refused to extend
the putative spouse doctrine to domestic partners. 268 Lena Velez and her
partner Krista Smith met in 1989 and began a domestic partner
relationship.269 In 1994, they filed a declaration of domestic partnership
with the City and County of San Francisco and again in 1996.270 In the
ensuing years, they purchased real property together, shared cars, living
expenses, pets, and maintained joint bank accounts. 271 However, they had
never registered as domestic partners with the State of California. 2
If the court had applied the putative spouse doctrine in Velez, Velez
still may not have qualified as a putative domestic partner. Since there was
never any attempt to register with the State, neither partner could have held
a belief in the existence of a state domestic partnership. Instead, the Velez
court summarily refused to apply the putative spouse doctrine to domestic
partners as outside the scope of the Domestic Partner Act and contrary to
273legislative intent.
The Velez court missed two important points. First, the court
overlooked the confusing and often competing local and state domestic
partnership registries.274 The new state law preempted local domestic
partnerships created after July 1, 2000, provided that the domestic partners
filed with the State. Family Code section 299.6 provides that a "[d]omestic
partnership created under any local.., ordinance or law before July 1,
2000, shall remain valid.., provided a Declaration of Domestic partnership
is filed by the domestic partners ... ,,275 However, the law allowed
267. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 656 (Ct. App. 2006).
268. Id. at 657-58 ("We acknowledge the objective of the most recent domestic partnership
legislation to expand the rights of domestic partners, but we cannot engraft onto the statutory
scheme putative spouse provisions that the legislature did not see fit to include. We must leave to
the Legislature the task of affording standing to putative domestic partners to proceed with
dissolution actions. Since the Domestic Partner Act has not done so, we find that appellant cannot
proceed under a putative domestic partner theory.").
269. Id. at 644.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 645.
272. Id
273. Id. at 657-58.
274. See Johnson, supra note 93, at 2153.
275. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.6(a) (West 2004).
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"municipalities to retain their domestic partnership registries provided that
they offer the same or broader rights than the state., 276 Apparently, Velez
believed she had a valid state domestic partnership because she incorrectly
believed that their San Francisco domestic partnership was included in the
state's system.277 If Velez held a good faith belief in the existence of a
valid state domestic partnership because of the San Francisco registration,
such a good faith belief should have qualified her as a putative domestic
partner.
Second, the court ignored the clear legislative mandate and purpose of
the domestic partnership legislation. The application of the putative spouse
doctrine to domestic partners would certainly have been consistent with the
express legislative purpose to equalize the rights of same-sex couples with
married couples:
The act is intended to help California move closer to fulfilling the
promises of inalienable rights, liberty, and equality. . .by providing all
caring and committed couples, regardless of their. .sexual orientation, the
opportunity to obtain essential rights, protections, and benefits and to
assume corresponding responsibilities, obligations, and duties and to
further the state's interest in promoting stable and lasting family
relationships.
278
Velez was incorrect and in 2008, the Fourth Appellate District Court of
Appeals applied the putative spouse doctrine to domestic partners.279 In In
re the Domestic Partnership of Ellis and Arriaga, Ellis and Arriaga signed
and had notarized the necessary paperwork to register their domestic
partnership with the Secretary of State.280 Ellis believed the paperwork was
duly filed and their partnership properly registered.28' When Ellis
discovered that their partnership was not registered with the State, he
claimed to be a putative domestic partner.282 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal agreed and specifically rejected the holding in Velez:
To the extent Velez is inconsistent with our conclusions, we respectfully
disagree with its conclusion regarding putative domestic partnerships. The
276. Johnson, supra note 93, at 2161.
277. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Velez v. Smith, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642 (Ct. App. 2006)
(No. A110868).
278. A.B. 205, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2003), available at http://www.assembly.
ca.gov/LGBT Caucus/laws/2003/ab0205/fulltextchapteredbill.htm.
279. Ellis v. Arriaga (In re the Domestic Partnership of Ellis and Arriaga), 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d
401, 406 (Ct. App. 2008), abrogated by Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211 (Cal.
2013).
280. Id. at 408.
281. Id
282. Id at 402.
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court in Velez stated that, if the Legislature had intended the putative
spouse doctrine to apply to registered domestic partnerships, it would have
expressly said so. As explained in detail, ante, however, the Domestic
Partner Act was specifically designed by the legislature to make the rights
and responsibilities of registered domestic partners as similar to the rights
and responsibilities of married couples as permissible under California
law, without actually recognizing a right of gay and lesbian couples to
marry. The Domestic partner Act marked a sea of change in the manner
by which fights were extended by law to registered domestic partners.
283
The Ellis court correctly interpreted the Domestic Partner Act to
superimpose California's complete body of family and marital law as
appropriate onto domestic partners. Certainly, the putative spouses should
receive the same consideration under the law.
V. CONCLUSION
The putative spouse doctrine has a long history in both canon and civil
law. As a community property state with a Spanish civil law heritage,
California courts readily accepted the putative spouse doctrine to save
otherwise void or voidable marriages, to permit an equal division of the
property accumulated during the putative marriage. However, the inclusion
of putative marriages into California's community property system was not
holistic or pure but rather piecemeal. Complexities developed along gender
lines since the wife was not always the innocent spouse and the cases failed
to address whether the guilty spouse was precluded from certain benefits of
marriage. The legislature and the courts addressed the application of other
incidentals of marriage bit by bit with a resulting body of law that is
inconsistent and confusing. Although a putative spouse is a "surviving
spouse" for intestate succession, a putative spouse is not a "surviving
spouse" entitled to a family allowance during estate administration.284
Some of the statutes referencing a putative spouse require "good faith,"
other statutes do not.285 Yet for those statutes that do not require good faith,
the courts have ironically limited the definition of a "putative spouse" to
those who are innocent and have a good faith belief in the existence of the
marriage.286
In 1970, California became the first state to recognize no-fault divorce.
Today, all of the states allow a spouse to obtain a no-fault divorce. In 1999,
283. Id at 408-09.
284. See infra Part III.B and III.C.
285. See infra Part III.A.
286. See infra Part III.D.
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California again led the way in recognizing domestic partnerships and later
included domestic partners in California's family and marital property law
systems. California's broad sweeping approach to domestic partners has
not been taken with putative spouses. The unfortunate result is a patchwork
of inconsistent statutes and judicial decisions.
California needs legislation adopting the putative spouse doctrine
purely and wholly into its family and community property system. The
fault or guilt of one spouse should not preclude the application of all marital
benefits to the putative spouses. This is not a windfall to the guilty but
instead simply a realization of the innocent spouse's expectations in a legal
marriage.
